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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Global economic developments in recent years have demonstrated the importance of 
understanding international balance sheets. Ongoing financial globalization—the 
accumulation of larger stocks of gross foreign assets and liabilities—has increased the 
magnitude of fluctuations in the value of cross-border holdings, whether scaled by GDP or 
domestic financial variables.2 In addition, there have been sizable shifts in the composition of 
asset and liability positions, with attendant revisions in the risk profiles of individual 
economies.3 Finally, the emergence of large external imbalances has led to renewed interest 
in the international adjustment mechanism and the dual role played by exchange rates in 
influencing both net capital flows and net capital gains on external holdings.4 
 
To improve our understanding of these phenomena, we assembled a comprehensive and up-
to-date dataset on the foreign assets and liabilities of advanced, emerging, and developing 
countries for the period 1970–2004. This updates and extends our initial contribution (Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001a), which included estimates for the external portfolios of 67 
countries over the period 1970–98. The new External Wealth of Nations Mark II (EWN II) 
dataset covers over twice as many countries (145 in total), incorporates an extensively 
revised methodology, and draws upon a richer range of data sources. 
 
In this paper, we describe the construction of the dataset and provide a few illustrative 
stylized facts. The virtually global coverage allows us to define ”world” trends meaningfully, 
as well as to investigate the scale of the global discrepancy in the measurement of foreign 
asset and liability positions. Among the key stylized facts that emerge from an initial data 
analysis, we highlight the further intensification in the degree of financial globalization 
during the past decade for both industrial and developing countries, despite the occurrence of 
several financial crises and the reversal in global stock market values in 2001–02. Marked 
shifts in the composition of international balance sheets are also noteworthy, with an 
increased reliance on debt liabilities as a source of external finance by major debtors (most 
notably, the United States), whereas the emerging markets have increased the equity 
component in their external liabilities and accumulated significant official reserve assets.  
 
We also examine recent developments in the evolution of net foreign asset positions. Among 
the industrial countries, there has been considerable persistence in the cross-sectional 
distribution: with the exception of the increase in the net external liabilities of the United 
States, the identities of the major creditors and debtors in 2004 are the same as in 1996. 
Among other countries, those in emerging Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) region, and the Western Hemisphere have experienced a significant increase in the 
scale of net external liabilities, while Africa, emerging Asia, and the Middle East have all 
experienced significant improvements in their net external positions.  
                                                 
2 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a, 2003, 2005a), Tille (2003). 
3 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005b). 
4 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005a), Tille (2003) and Gourinchas and Rey (2005). 
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We also highlight significant differences in the composition of countries’ external portfolios. 
A significant number of industrial countries are “short debt, long equity” (most notably, the 
United States and the United Kingdom), with the important exception of Japan, which is 
“long debt, short equity.” In contrast, emerging markets and developing countries are 
typically “short equity,” with those countries with overall negative net liability positions 
having net liabilities in both debt and equity categories.  Finally, we emphasize the 
importance of the valuation channel—innovations to the net foreign asset position are 
significantly more volatile than the current account. Differences between changes in net 
foreign assets and the current account balance are quite persistent in many countries and 
represent an important source of long-term shifts in net external positions. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we explain the methodology that 
was employed to generate estimates of foreign asset and liability positions. The scale and 
scope of the dataset is described in Section III. We discuss selected empirical findings in 
Section IV, with some concluding remarks provided in Section V. A web appendix provides 
detailed notes for each country appearing in the dataset. 
 
 
II.   METHODOLOGY  
In the Mark I version of this dataset, we employed a broadly uniform methodology to 
construct estimates of foreign asset and liability positions for 67 countries over 1970–1998, 
which relied extensively on cumulative flow data with valuation adjustments. Since then, a 
much broader group of countries has begun to publish estimates of external assets and 
liabilities—the so-called International Investment Position (IIP)—following the methodology 
described in the IMF Balance of Payments Manual, fifth edition, 1993 (BPM5).  
 
We take these developments into account by incorporating national estimates of IIPs into our 
estimation methodology. For most countries, we use as a benchmark the official IIP estimates 
for recent years.5 We then work backward with data on capital flows, together with 
calculations for capital gains and losses, to generate estimates for stock positions for earlier 
years, back to 1970 in most cases. Since there is much cross-country variation in the 
reliability of the data on capital flows and estimated stock positions, we employ a range of 
valuation techniques to obtain the most appropriate series for each country.  
 
Before turning to a description of estimation issues in relation to individual categories on the 
international balance sheet, it is useful to clarify the nature of the balance of payments and 
international investment position (IIP) data which form the backbone of our database. The 5th 
revision of the Balance of Payments Manual (IMF, 1993) works on the basis of the residence 
principle—hence, external assets and liabilities, as well as capital inflows and outflows, refer 
                                                 
5 However, reported IIP estimates may have only incomplete coverage of a country’s external 
position. In those cases, we use alternative methods and sources to come up with our own 
estimates.  
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to claims and transactions between a country’s residents and nonresidents. International 
holdings and international transactions are classified in the following broad categories:  
 
• Portfolio investment, subdivided into equity securities and debt securities (including 
bonds and money market instruments); 
 
• Foreign direct investment, which refers to equity participations above 10 percent;6 
 
• Other investment (which includes debt instruments such as loans, deposits, and trade 
credits); 
 
• Financial derivatives; and  
 
• Reserve assets. 
 
For each of these broad categories, balance of payments data measure net capital inflows and 
outflows during a recording period, and the IIP data measure the stocks of external assets and 
liabilities at the end of the recording period. 
 
More specifically, capital inflows measure net purchases or sales by nonresidents of domestic 
assets, while outflows measure net purchases or sales of foreign assets by residents.7 From 
this definition it should be clear that both capital inflows and capital outflows can also take 
negative values—for example, if nonresidents are net sellers of domestic shares in a given 
year, portfolio equity inflows will be negative. Similarly, if a government repays a portion of 
its external debt, the reduction in nonresidents’ claims on the government is recorded as a 
negative capital inflow, because nonresidents are net sellers of bonds issued by the domestic 
government.  
 
The underlying stocks of external assets and liabilities are, in general, positive. There are, 
however, a few exceptions. The most common one relates to foreign direct investment. For 
example, a company investing $100 in equity of a firm overseas may borrow an amount of 
$110 from that firm via an intracompany loan. In this case the stock of FDI abroad would be 
-$10 (see BPM5 and IMF (2003)). It is also possible for domestic residents to be shorting 
equities in a foreign country, in which case portfolio equity assets would be negative. Be that 
as it may, these occurrences are extremely rare in our data. 
 
Our data classification follows the one described above, but groups together portfolio debt 
and other investment, reporting the stock of external debt assets and external debt liabilities. 
                                                 
6 Once an FDI investment is established, all subsequent financial transactions between the 
parent and affiliate are classified under FDI, including intrafirm debt assets and liabilities. 
7 Throughout the paper we measure net purchases of foreign assets by residents and of 
domestic assets by nonresidents with a positive sign. In balance of payments statistics, the 
former have a negative sign.  
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The decomposition between bonds and other investment is available only for countries that 
report the IIP. However, this reporting period is typically much shorter than the time span 
that our database covers. 
 
Our methodology relies both on direct estimates of stocks, assembled from a variety of 
sources, and on indirect estimates constructed using cumulative flows with appropriate 
valuation adjustments. The cumulative flow method can be illustrated as follows. Denote by 
D the stock of holdings at the end of year t and by d the flow of net purchases during year t. 
Let tp be the U.S. dollar price of asset category D at the end of period t (for example, the 
end-of-year stock market price index measured in dollars), and tp the average price of asset 
D during year t. Then 
 1
1
.t tt t t
t t
p pD D d
p p−−
= +  (1) 
 
That is, the value of holdings at the end of period t is the sum of holdings at the end of the 
previous period, adjusted for valuation changes, and net purchases during the year, evaluated 
at end-of-year asset prices. This updating formula can be used to obtain holdings tD given an 
estimate of holdings 1tD − , flows td , and asset prices p, or to back out 1tD − given tD , td , and 
p.  
 
When series are constructed cumulating flows forward, it is important to obtain initial values 
for 1970 (or later starting years). Our main general source for this purpose is the pioneering 
work of Stefan Sinn (1994) who constructed estimates of external asset and liability positions 
for 145 countries over 1970–87. For those countries where we construct historical data by 
cumulating flows backward from a stock measure dating after 1970, the data collected by 
Sinn provide a useful check on the reliability of the estimates.  
 
The following sub-sections provide more detail, by asset category, on the construction of the 
data. Details on individual country estimates are provided in the data appendix.8    
 
  
A.   Portfolio Equity Assets and Liabilities 
Portfolio equity holdings measure ownership of shares of companies and mutual funds that 
are below the 10 percent threshold—the statistical convention for distinguishing between 
portfolio and direct investment. We use three primary sources for the stocks of portfolio 
equity assets and liabilities:  
 
                                                 
8 The data and its appendix are available via the Internet at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/data/wp0669.zip. 
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• Stock estimates as reported in the IIP section of the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) and Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPS); 
 
• the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), covering over 60 investor 
countries and territories, which provides data on the geographical allocation of these 
entities’ portfolio asset holdings over 220 destination territories;  
 
• Bilateral estimates on foreign holdings of portfolio equity assets in the United States 
and U.S. holdings of equity overseas, constructed by Frank Warnock on the basis of 
U.S. Treasury data.9  
 
In particular, the equity liabilities of a country derived from the CPIS provide a lower bound 
on that country’s stock of equity liabilities, and holdings in the United States provide a lower 
bound on the country’s total equity asset holdings. The majority of countries report their 
holdings at market value.  
 
However, only very few countries have consistently reported their IIP over the whole sample 
period, with the majority of countries starting to report after 1990. We therefore complement 
and integrate these stock estimates with balance of payments data on portfolio equity inflows 
and outflows. As in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a), we construct market-value estimates of 
portfolio equity assets and liabilities by using cumulated portfolio equity outflows (for assets) 
and inflows (for liabilities), adjusted so as to take into account fluctuations in stock prices. 
These prices are measured with price indices for domestic and international stock markets, 
where we typically assume that a country invests its foreign equity holdings in a “world” 
portfolio with weights identical to the Morgan Stanley Capital International’s world index.10 
For portfolio equity foreign liabilities, we assume that foreign investors hold a broadly based 
index of domestic shares, such that the value of portfolio equity liabilities rises in line with 
the domestic stock market.  
 
In this paper we use cumulative flows not only forward from an initial value, as in Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2001a), but also backward (as is the case, for example, when a country first 
publishes a stock estimate toward the end of the sample) to generate alternative series. This 
extension is justified by the large number of countries that have started reporting their IIP 
over the past few years.  
 
                                                 
9  See Chinn, Rogers, and Warnock (2006) and Warnock and Warnock (2005) for data on 
U.S. equity liabilities and Thomas, Warnock, and Wongswan (2004) for U.S. equity assets. 
10 For countries with large stock markets, we use the world index excluding the home 
country. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) show that the geographical composition of foreign 
equity portfolios is systematically affected by bilateral factors such as trade linkages and 
gravity-type variables; however, the global index is broadly appropriate as a valuation 
benchmark. 
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In some cases, the forward cumulative flow series yields estimates in line with the reported 
stock for recent years. In other cases, however, the reported stock estimate is  much larger 
than what the underlying flows in preceding years would justify, suggesting that past capital 
flows have been underreported. Calculating past holdings using adjusted cumulative flow 
backward would imply implausibly large initial stocks. In these cases, we extend the stock 
backward using the percentage change in the adjusted cumulative flow series or, in some 
cases, the percentage change in holdings vis-à-vis the United States.  
 
For countries that do not publish IIP data, we can proxy the stock of portfolio equity 
liabilities for 2001–03 with the holdings in that country reported by participants to the CPIS. 
Those holdings can then be extended backwards using adjusted flows or the percentage 
change in the adjusted cumulative flow series. For portfolio equity assets, we can use 
estimated holdings in the United States as a lower bound.  
 
B.   Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities 
The FDI category includes controlling stakes in acquired foreign firms, in addition to 
greenfield investments.11 In addition, at least for some countries, an increasingly important 
component of FDI is foreign property investment. Our main data sources for the stocks of 
foreign direct investment are: 
 
• IIP estimates; 
 
• Estimates reported by UNCTAD’s World Investment Report. 
 
The majority of countries provide book-value estimates of FDI assets and liabilities, with 
only a relatively small number reporting market-value estimates. Again, we complement 
existing stock estimates with cumulative flow measures, with valuation changes designed to 
capture shifts in relative prices across countries.  
 
• For market-value series, we adjust positions for shifts in stock market price indices, 
similar to our method for portfolio equity holdings.12  
 
                                                 
11 The threshold is 10 percent of an entity’s equity. Thus, FDI encompasses minority stakes 
in addition to majority control. The 10 percent threshold is intended to differentiate FDI from 
portfolio equity positions that are “passive” investments. 
12 This correction is subject to several caveats. First, if a country’s FDI liabilities take the 
form of greenfield investments, these may bear little relation to the activities represented by 
the firms on the domestic stock market. Second, some proportion of FDI is attributable to 
investment in residential and commercial properties. Third, the value of FDI includes the 
value of accumulated cash and liquid assets held by an affiliate—the value of such treasury 
holdings again will not have a direct relationship with the stock market. 
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• For book-value series, we use two alternative methods: either cumulative U.S. dollar 
flows (for countries with either very volatile real exchange rate measures or FDI 
concentrated in commodity-producing sectors or extractive industries); or cumulative 
flows adjusting outstanding holdings for fluctuations in real exchange rates (as in 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001a). For example, if the real exchange rate of a country 
appreciates relative to the U.S. dollar we assume that the U.S. dollar value of FDI 
holdings in the country correspondingly increases.  
 
As in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a), our initial values are based on estimates by Sinn 
(1994) or, for several emerging markets, derived from OECD (1972), complemented with 
cumulative flows between 1967 and 1970. If data on FDI flows from the IMF’s Balance of 
Payments Statistics are unavailable or incomplete, we use FDI inflows and outflows reported 
by UNCTAD. Finally, for a few countries we extrapolate the evolution of FDI flows and 
stocks from their bilateral positions and transactions vis-à-vis the United States, as reported 
by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.   
 
C.   Debt Assets and Liabilities 
The debt category offers the greatest data challenges, particularly in the measurement of 
foreign debt assets. This category includes portfolio debt securities, plus bank loans and 
deposits and other debt instruments. Our main data sources are: 
 
• The country’s reported IIP; 
 
• The World Bank’s Global Development Finance database (only for external debt 
liabilities of developing countries and emerging markets); 
 
• The IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database (only for external debt 
liabilities of developing countries and emerging markets); 
 
• The Quarterly External Debt Database (QEDS), jointly developed by the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund, which brings together detailed external debt 
data that are published individually by countries that subscribe to the IMF’s Special 
Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS).13  
 
• The IMF’s CPIS (for portfolio debt assets and, indirectly, portfolio debt liabilities); 
 
• The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) data on a country’s assets and liabilities 
vis-à-vis BIS-reporting banks; 
 
                                                 
13 These data can be found at the link: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/EXTDECQEDS/0,,m
enuPK:1805431~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:1805415,00.html 
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• Data on foreign assets and liabilities of banks and other banking institutions reported 
by IFS (lines 7a.d, 7b.d, 7e.d, 7f.d, 7k.d, 7m.d); 
 
• National sources. 
 
For industrial countries, our previous work did not provide direct estimates of gross debt 
positions. In this paper, we use existing estimates of debt holdings overseas, extended 
backward with capital flows with valuation adjustments, often complemented with data from 
national sources. The valuation adjustment is based on available information on the currency 
composition of debt assets and liabilities. For example, if a country’s debt holdings are 
estimated to be entirely denominated in euros, the value of holdings is estimated adjusting 
the past (or subsequent) holdings for changes in the end-of-year exchange rate between the 
euro and the U.S. dollar, and adding (or subtracting) the flows occurring during the year.  
 
For emerging markets and developing countries, a measure of the stock of external debt 
liabilities is typically available from the World Bank and/or the WEO for most of the entire 
sample period. When necessary, these series are extended with cumulative flow data, with 
valuation adjustments to reflect the currency composition of debt positions. 
 
Measuring debt assets is, however, much more complex.14 The only comprehensive series of 
holdings of debt assets overseas by domestic residents is the IIP. While it is now reported by 
around 100 countries, it is often available only for recent years. In addition, historical data on 
capital outflows are often incomplete—indeed, some countries only report data on “net” 
other investment flows for most of the sample period. To address these shortcomings, we 
again use a variety of methods. For several countries we estimate the stock of debt assets as 
the sum of claims by nonbank domestic residents on BIS-reporting banks (reported by such 
banks, and available from 1977 onward) plus foreign assets by commercial banks and other 
banking institutions (reported by IFS). The BIS series in particular may contain holdings 
accumulated through unrecorded financial flows (for example, capital flight). We also 
construct series based on cumulative capital outflows backward, in cases when the country 
starts reporting its IIP late in the sample, and forward (when no IIP data on debt asset 
holdings are reported or such value appears too low relative to the underlying capital 
outflows). 15 Finally, in some cases we combine holdings data from IFS, BIS, and national 
sources with capital flow data to construct a series for debt assets. 
 
D.   Financial Derivatives 
The stock of financial derivatives corresponds to the market value of the outstanding 
                                                 
14 The extensive literature on capital flight constitutes an early attempt to provide estimates 
of foreign asset holdings by domestic residents, particularly for developing countries. See, 
for example, Cuddington (1987), Dooley (1988), Claessens (1997), and the discussion below. 
15 For countries with significant unrecorded outflows we also make use of data on net errors 
and omissions to estimate the value of overseas debt holdings.  
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derivatives’ contracts. Only a few countries report separately data on the value of the 
outstanding stock of financial derivatives. Whenever such data are available, we include 
them in our dataset. 
 
E.   Official Reserves 
As in our previous work, we use IMF data on total reserves minus gold (which include 
foreign exchange, SDR holdings, and the reserve position in the IMF), supplemented by data 
from national sources. Gold holdings are excluded, primarily since the gold held by a central 
bank does not constitute a liability of another country.  
 
F.   Measurement Error 
Clearly measurement error in our dataset is substantial, for two main reasons. The first is the 
incomplete reporting of balance of payments and especially IIP data, and the second is the 
difficulty of tracking increasingly complex international financial transactions.  
The first problem is particularly acute for countries in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, 
and small financial centers (for which small errors in measuring gross positions translate into 
large errors in the measurement of net positions). An additional source of error arises because 
of the discrepancy between current account transactions and financial flows (the so-called net 
errors and omissions), an issue discussed at length in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a). In 
this dataset we do not make systematic use of net errors and omissions in calculating a 
country’s net external position, but report their cumulative value separately. In some cases, 
our alternative data sources (such as holdings by a country’s residents in BIS-reporting banks 
for unrecorded outflows, or a country’s survey of its liabilities for unrecorded inflows) may 
capture part of these holdings.  
 
With regard to the second reason, the increased complexity of financial instruments and of 
the financial structure of companies, together with the growing integration of international 
financial markets, has complicated further the task of accurately measuring external 
positions. In some cases, the increase in the size of gross international transactions may 
overstate the extent of financial interdependence between different economies. For example, 
a U.S. financial institution can set up a mutual fund in an offshore center, which in turn 
invests in the United States, and whose shares are purchased by, say, euro area residents. 
Rather than measuring simply a portfolio equity inflow in the United States from the euro 
area, the data will record a portfolio equity inflow in the offshore center (from the euro area), 
and a corresponding outflow from the offshore center to the United States. To some extent 
these developments are reminiscent of trends in goods’ trade, where the ratio of value added 
to total exports may be very small.   
 
While these problems need to be taken into account when interpreting the data, 
understanding recent trends in global financial integration and international borrowing and 
lending requires a global perspective. In that light, we view the construction of (albeit 
imperfect) estimates of external positions for all major “players” in the international financial 
system as a crucial first step.  
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III.   THE DATASET: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW 
Our dataset covers 145 countries over 1970–2004, and also reports data for the euro area as a 
whole. We include all countries with income above US$1 billion in 2000 (or US$2 billion in 
2004). The only exceptions are 3 small international financial centers—the Bahamas, 
Barbados, and the Netherlands Antilles—plus Iraq and Afghanistan.16 We report aggregate 
foreign asset and liability positions. In addition, we also include the breakdown between 
portfolio equity, direct investment, and debt categories. We provide a complete span of data 
for the period 1970–2004 for 91 countries. For a further 54 countries, we report data for 
shorter periods. 
 
A.   The World NFA Discrepancy 
Given the effectively global coverage of the data, we can document not only regional and 
country trends, but also address for the first time consistency issues between the world data 
on foreign assets and liabilities. While the existence of a world current account discrepancy 
is well known and documented (see, for example, the International Monetary Fund’s Balance 
of Payments Statistics Yearbook  and Marquez and Workman, 2001), lack of data has so far 
prevented a similar analysis for the stocks of external assets and liabilities.17  That the world 
current account discrepancy and the difference between world investment income earnings 
and payments are systematically negative, together with anecdotal evidence of 
underreporting of foreign assets, suggests that measured world external liabilities will exceed 
assets.  
 
Figure 1 shows that this is indeed the case. The figure plots the cumulative value of the world 
current account discrepancy, together with the difference between total external assets and 
liabilities measured in our dataset, scaling both series by world GDP. The co-movement 
between the two series is striking, all the more so in light of the fact that, as described in the 
previous section, the new version of our dataset is based to a much weaker extent on 
cumulative capital flows than the previous one. We then decompose the global stock gap 
between the underlying asset categories. This is done in Figure 2, which shows that portfolio 
equity holdings account for almost half of the world NFA discrepancy, with the remainder 
accounted for by the debt category.18  
                                                 
16 For the former, we can construct proxies of their gross external positions using the data 
sources discussed in the previous section. However, the substantial margin of error around 
these estimates and their large size relative to domestic economic activity makes it very 
difficult to construct a reasonably consistent series for the net external position.  
17 While it is true that some of the offshore centers not included in the dataset hold large 
stocks of assets and liabilities (relative to their size), they are de facto pure intermediaries, 
with trivial net positions. Therefore they would not significantly alter the picture with regard 
to differences between “global” assets and liabilities, although they may affect the 
breakdown between equity and debt.  
18 Foreign direct investment is the most problematic series from the point of view of 
measurement, given that some countries report it at book value and others at market value.  
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Thanks to the results of the portfolio survey, it is possible to shed some more light on the 
discrepancy between portfolio equity assets and liabilities, by comparing total liabilities 
reported by a country with the total assets that other countries claim to be holding in that 
location. The latter information can be gleaned from the CPIS. This is done in Table 1, which 
highlights how the portfolio equity liabilities reported by Ireland, Luxembourg, and the 
United States are substantially higher than the reported portfolio equity holdings in these 
economies by CPIS-reporting countries.  
 
These results suggest that the source of the problem is the under-reporting of claims on these 
countries. For Ireland and the United States, this is bolstered by additional bilateral evidence 
obtained by comparing the surveys on foreign holders of domestic equities conducted by 
such countries with the data from the CPIS. As shown in Table 2, U.S.-reported data on 
holders of U.S. equities are much higher for financial centers (such as Singapore, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) than holdings reported by these financial centers.19 
This is a result to be expected—these shares may be held by custodians in these countries on 
behalf of nonresidents. There is also a large discrepancy between Canadian holdings reported 
by the United States and those reported by Canada. As for Ireland, the largest discrepancies 
are those with the United Kingdom and the United States, which total over US$200 billion.  
 
In sum, while some progress can be made in determining where some of the underreported 
external assets are held, it is much more difficult to establish which country’s residents hold 
such claims. Looking forward, increased availability of bilateral data should allow countries 
to refine and widen the scope of their estimates, particularly for assets held overseas. 
 
IV.   SELECTED EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In this section, we briefly present some general patterns in the data. We first examine 
indicators of financial globalization. Next, we report findings on the composition of 
international balance sheets. Finally, we describe some features about the evolution of net 
foreign asset positions. In presenting the data, we occasionally divide countries into two 
groups: long-standing OECD countries, which we denote as ”industrial,” and the remaining 
countries, which we denote as ‘emerging’ and developing (Appendix 1). The separation is 
clearly artificial in some cases—for example, Hong Kong S.A.R. and Singapore have 
considerably higher GDP per capita than several of the ”industrial” countries.  
 
A.   The Scale of International Financial Integration 
In Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003), we constructed a volume-based measure of international 
financial integration 
 
                                                 
19 The large difference for holdings in Caribbean offshore centers is explained by the partial 
participation of these centers to the CPIS. For example, the survey for the Cayman Islands 
did not cover mutual funds. 
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where FA (FL) denotes the stock of external assets (liabilities). The IFIGDP ratio provides a 
volume-based measure of international financial integration.  
 
Figure 3 plots this ratio for both the industrial group of countries and emerging markets and 
developing countries over the period 1970–2004.20 Over this period, the ratio has increased 
by a factor of 7, from 45 percent in 1970 to over 300 percent in 2004. During the 1970s and 
1980s, the increase in international financial integration was fairly gradual (IFIGDP reached 
100 percent only in 1987), but an acceleration took place in the mid-1990s: IFIGDP passed 
200 percent in 1998 and 300 percent in 2004.21  
 
 The scale of international financial integration for the emerging markets/developing 
countries group has also increased steadily over time, tracking closely trends for industrial 
countries until the early 1990s.22 From then on, however, the acceleration in cross-border 
asset trade by industrial countries was not matched by the emerging markets and developing 
country group, where the pace has been much more gradual. 
 
The difference between the two groups of countries is even starker when the evolution of 
international financial integration is compared with international trade integration. Figure 4 
displays the sum of external assets and liabilities, scaled by the sum of imports and exports of 
goods and services. For both groups, the expansion of asset trade outstripped the expansion 
of product trade from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, with the ratio higher for industrial 
countries throughout the period. From then onward the increase in the ratio for industrial 
countries was very rapid, with the spectacular increase in asset trade outpacing a relatively 
modest expansion in goods’ trade. For emerging markets trade in goods increased much more 
rapidly than for industrial countries during this period, but the growth in asset trade was 
instead much slower than in industrial countries, and therefore the ratio has remained broadly 
stable over the past 20 years.  
 
Do these stylized facts hold for holdings of equity instruments as well? To explore this issue, 
we report a second measure of financial integration that focuses exclusively on portfolio 
equity and FDI holdings (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003): 
                                                 
20 Excluding Luxembourg (whose external position is available only from 2000 onwards) 
lowers the value of IFIGDP for industrial countries over the past five years by 15 to 20 
percentage points, without altering the overall trend. Similarly, excluding Hong Kong S.A.R. 
(where data are available since 1989) lowers IFIGDP for emerging markets, without altering 
the overall trend. 
21 A test for a trend break is significant, starting in 1994. If a single trend break is permitted 
over 1970-2004, the statistical test identifies 1998 is the most significant year. 
22 The sample composition changes over time, since data are missing for a number of non-
industrial countries for the early years of the sample. 
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where PEQA (PEQL) denotes the stock of portfolio equity assets and FDIA (FDIL) denotes 
the stock of direct investment assets (liabilities). Figure 5 shows the evolution of GEQGDP  
for both country groups. For the industrial group, the figure shows three phases—until 1985, 
theGEQGDP ratio was broadly stable; from 1985 to 1995, it gradually increased; since 1996, 
it increased much more rapidly, save for the 2001–02 disruption from the reversal in global 
equity valuations. The trend has been reasonably similar for emerging markets and 
developing countries, with cross-border equity positions growing strongly during the 1990s. 
Indeed, equity integration for these countries has grown not only with respect to their GDP, 
but also with respect to trade (graph not shown), unlike their total financial assets and 
liabilities. This suggests a significant shift in the structure of these countries’ external 
portfolios, an issue we take up in the next subsection. 
 
B.   Trends in External Capital Structure 
The composition of international balance sheets has been the subject of wide discussion in 
recent years, with an excessive reliance on debt finance perceived as increasing vulnerability 
and an equity-based financing promoted as improving international risk sharing (Rogoff, 
1999; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001b). What do recent developments tell us about the trends 
in external capital structure? While we describe developments for both large country 
groupings, we focus more on the group of emerging markets and developing countries.23 
 
We first consider the share of equity (portfolio and FDI) liabilities in total liabilities 
 
 ( )_ ,it itit
it
PEQL FDILEQSHARE LIAB
FL
+=  (4) 
 
Figure 6 shows the dynamics of _EQSHARE LIAB  for the industrial and developing country 
groups. The trends are broadly similar—a decline during the 1970s (the flip-side of the 
explosion in international debt trade during that decade), and an increase in the 1980s and 
especially the 1990s. For industrial countries, the past five years have seen a reversal 
in _EQSHARE LIAB , with the 2004 value falling to 36 percent.  
 
As explained in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005b), this is only partly attributable to the 
decline in equity valuations during 2000–02, and also reflects a significant shift in the 
composition of capital flows, with debt flows dominating in recent years. However, for 
emerging markets and developing countries the increase in the relative importance of equity 
liabilities has continued unabated—in 2004 they accounted for half of total external 
                                                 
23 Trends for industrial countries are discussed more at length in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2003). 
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liabilities. Underlying this trend is a steady increase in the share of FDI, which now accounts 
for about 75 percent of developing countries’ equity liabilities, as well as a sharp increase in 
the value of the portfolio equity liabilities, particularly during the past decade, in line with 
the development of local financial markets. 24 
 
The decline in the relative weight of debt in the external portfolio of developing countries 
and emerging markets has been accompanied on the asset side by rapid accumulation of 
official reserves. Figure 7, which reports the ratio of external debt and official reserves to 
exports for the entire group of emerging and developing economies, highlights these trends. 
The dramatic decline in the aggregate ratio of debt to exports since the late 1980s is 
remarkable, and holds also if we take the average or the median external debt-to-export ratio, 
rather than the aggregate one. As a result of these developments, the ratio of official reserves 
to total debt liabilities has increased from 29 percent in 1998 to 64 percent in 2004. The 
growth in reserve holdings by emerging markets and developing countries stands out also 
when compared with developments in industrial countries: while total holdings of reserves by 
both country groups were virtually the same in 1995 (over $700 billion), by 2004 total 
reserve holdings by emerging markets and developing countries (just under $2.5 trillion) 
exceed holdings in industrial countries by $900 billion.  
 
C.   Net Foreign Asset Positions 
We begin our discussion by characterizing the distribution of net external positions at the end 
of 2004, the final year of our dataset. Figure 8 plots the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP 
against (log) GDP per capita for the global sample of countries. While the cross-sectional 
correlation is significantly positive at 0.45, there is considerable variation in positions at any 
given level of development. This is especially the case for the high-income group of 
countries, where the level of dispersion is much wider than for the lower-income cohorts. In 
terms of our country groupings, the variation of GDP per capita explains over 40 percent of 
the cross-sectional variance for industrial countries, and less than 30 percent for emerging 
markets and developing countries. Among the latter, it is noteworthy that the largest creditor 
positions are disproportionately identified with oil producers and the richer Asian countries.  
 
We turn next to the evolution of net external positions over time for large country groupings. 
For this purpose, it is useful to separate out the United States from other industrial countries. 
Figure 9 plots the aggregate net foreign asset position, scaled by the country/group’s GDP, 
for emerging and developing countries, other industrial countries, and the United States, from 
1980 onward.25 In addition to the well-known deterioration in the U.S. net external position, 
                                                 
24 The share of portfolio equity liabilities may be overstated in part because many countries 
report FDI liabilities at book value rather than at market value (IMF, 2003a). 
 
25 The broad trends in the data are analogous if we scale net foreign assets by world GDP (net 
external positions do not sum to zero because of the global discrepancy described earlier). 
The positions of the United States and emerging markets are scaled down relative to other 
industrial countries, since the latter group is larger in size. For a discussion of recent trends in 
global imbalances, see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005b).  
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the chart also highlights the dramatic improvement in the aggregate net external position of 
emerging markets and developing countries since the late 1990s. As for other industrial 
countries, the upward trend in their net external position was reversed since 2001, primarily 
because of a deterioration in Spain, Italy, Australia, and the United Kingdom. 
 
The evolution of net foreign assets in recent years is described in more detail in Figures 10a-
10f, with Table 3 providing correlations and group averages, weighted by GDP. Figure 10a 
and Table 3 show that there was relatively little change on average for the industrial 
countries, with considerable cross-sectional persistence. No industrial country switched 
between creditor and debtor status, with the most remarkable shift being the increased 
indebtedness of the United States. Among emerging and developing regions, emerging 
Europe, the CIS, and several Latin American countries experienced an expansion in net 
external liabilities over 1996–2004. However, other regions underwent a significant 
improvement in their net positions—the Middle East experienced the most dramatic gain, 
followed by emerging Asia and Africa. While the recent increase in oil prices is certainly 
important for the Middle East group, the main impetus for emerging Asia has been a focus on 
improving the external balance sheet in the wake of the 1997–98 Asian and Russian financial 
crises. 
 
We conclude the discussion of net external positions by briefly returning to the issue of 
measurement error (see Section II.F). Table 4 provides data on the cumulative value of net 
errors and omissions as of the end of 2004. For the purpose of the discussion, we will refer to 
positive net errors and omissions as unrecorded capital inflows and negative errors and 
omissions as unrecorded capital outflows. On the one side, Switzerland is by far the largest 
receiver of unrecorded capital inflows. 26 On the other side, a number of countries have 
experienced unrecorded capital outflows of the order of 20 percent of GDP or more, with 
Russia, Norway, and Kuwait standing out in terms of absolute magnitudes. While for 
Switzerland this does not necessarily bias its estimated net external position, since 
unrecorded inflows may well be captured by the survey data used to calculate the IIP of the 
country, for countries experiencing unrecorded outflows it is less likely that the cumulative 
value of these flow is captured in the estimates of external assets. More generally, these 
figures provide a rough sense of the notable margins of uncertainty surrounding external 
accounts.  
 
We also examine the composition of net foreign asset positions. This is important, since the 
average returns and risk profile associated with a given net foreign asset position depend on 
the composition of foreign assets and liabilities. In Figure 11a, we plot the net equity position 
against the net debt position for the group of industrial countries. Ireland and Luxembourg 
are excluded as extreme outliers—both have very high positive net debt and negative net 
                                                 
26 This does not necessarily bias its estimated net external position, since unrecorded inflows 
may well be captured by the survey data used to calculate the international investment 
position of the country. 
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equity positions.27 This scatter diagram shows that there is no systemic cross-sectional 
relation between net debt and net equity (the correlation is 0.02).28 Table 5a shows the matrix 
of net debt and net equity positions. A substantial number of industrial countries (including 
the United States and the United Kingdom) display the “hedge fund” characteristic of being 
long in foreign equity and short in foreign debt, while the only major industrial country to 
display the opposite pattern is Japan.29  
 
Figure 11b shows that for emerging markets and developing countries there is a typically a 
positive relation between net debt and net equity (the correlation is 0.35).30 No country 
exhibits the “short debt, long equity’ profile”: as is documented in Table 5b, 71 developing 
countries have net liabilities in both the debt and equity categories. An interesting feature is 
that 31 of the 39 countries with positive net debt positions have negative net equity 
liabilities—largely reflecting the high official reserves positions of the major recipients of 
FDI and portfolio equity inflows. 
 
The documented cross-country differences in portfolio structure in general, and the 
importance of equity holdings in particular, suggest that changes in the valuation of assets 
and liabilities can play an important role in driving net foreign assets, in addition to net 
borrowing or lending. Indeed, in previous work we have argued that capital gains and losses 
on outstanding holdings of foreign assets and liabilities are quantitatively important in 
driving a wedge between the current account balance and changes in net foreign assets.31 
Table 6 shows that the correlation between these variables has declined over time, falling 
from 0.71 in 1971–1981 to 0.33 in 1993–2004 for the industrial group and from 0.72 to 0.47 
                                                 
27 For financial centers with a large mutual fund industry, the net portfolio equity position is 
likely to be negative because foreign-owned shares in mutual funds are recorded as portfolio 
equity liabilities, even though some of the assets of the mutual funds are invested in bonds 
and money market instruments. 
28 The cross-sectional correlation when Ireland and Luxembourg are included is -0.996.  
29 Ireland and Luxembourg also are long in foreign debt and short in foreign equity, reflecting 
their roles as major offshore centers for the global mutual fund industry. 
30 For a number of Middle Eastern countries, such as Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, 
portfolio equity holdings overseas are likely to be substantially underestimated. This is 
because these countries do not report data portfolio equity outflows or holdings, and partner-
country data (such as the U.S. survey of portfolio equity liabilities) only report aggregate 
holdings of  “Middle East oil exporters.” Any reasonable assumption about the extent of 
diversification of external asset holdings would imply that these countries have a positive net 
equity position. 
31 As discussed in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a), capital transfers (such as debt 
forgiveness) and net errors and omissions can also drive a wedge between the current account 
and the change in net foreign assets. We come back to this issue below. 
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for a selected group of emerging markets. The weakening of the correlation is the counterpart 
to the accumulation of larger gross external holdings—the importance of valuation effects is 
generally in proportion to the scale of the international balance sheet. Tables 7a-7b show that 
the valuation channel typically implies larger short-term volatility of changes in net foreign 
assets relative to the current account balance.  
 
However, it is also important to know whether the valuation channel merely raises volatility 
or also influences the long-term evolution of the net foreign asset position. While there is a 
strong cross-sectional correlation between the cumulative current account balance and the 
change in the net foreign asset position over long time periods for both industrial countries 
and emerging markets, Tables 8a-8b demonstrate that the cumulative divergence over time 
can be quite substantial. These tables present data on the change in the net foreign asset 
position, the cumulative current account, cumulative capital transfers, and cumulative errors 
and omissions. To understand the link between these variables, it is useful to abstract initially 
from capital gains and losses. If errors and omissions measure unrecorded capital flows that 
are also not captured by the stock data, or if they represent a mismeasurement of underlying 
trade flows, we would expect the sum of current account, capital transfers, and errors and 
omissions to be close to the change in net foreign assets. If instead errors and omissions 
measure unrecorded capital inflows that are captured by the stock data (something more 
likely to occur with unrecorded inflows than unrecorded outflows) then the sum of the 
current account and capital transfers would be close to the change in net foreign assets. 
 
Within the “industrial” group, there is a number of countries where the difference between 
the change in net foreign assets and the cumulative current account is substantially positive 
(primarily Switzerland, but also the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom). While 
capital transfers explain the divergence for Canada (linked to the move to Canada of wealthy 
immigrants during the 1990s, as discussed in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001a), the data 
suggest substantial cumulative capital gains for the United States and Switzerland. In 
contrast, the difference between changes in net foreign assets and the cumulative current 
account is substantially negative for the Netherlands, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, New 
Zealand, and Spain, and does not appear to be explained by capital transfers or errors and 
omissions. 
 
Among the developing countries, Table 8b shows that differences between cumulative 
current account balances and changes in net foreign assets in emerging markets and 
developing countries can be substantial even over a protracted period of time.32 As is 
discussed in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005a), these differences can often be attributed  to 
negative cumulative valuation effects. In turn, these result from a combination of exchange 
rate depreciation (since debt liabilities are disproportionately in foreign currency) and fast-
growing domestic asset valuations (with portfolio equity and FDI liabilities rising in value 
over time). The table also highlights the remarkable size of errors and omissions, likely 
capturing unrecorded capital outflows, particularly in the Philippines and Venezuela.  
                                                 
32 Table 8b and Figure 12b also shows the impact of debt-reduction schemes, which can drive 
a wedge between cumulative current account deficits and changes in net foreign asset 
positions. 
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In sum, the past decade has witnessed significant changes in net external positions across the 
globe. Emerging markets and developing countries as a group have experienced a substantial 
improvement in their aggregate external positions since the late 1990s, driven in particular by 
developments in emerging Asia and the Middle East. Other regions, such  as emerging 
Europe, have accumulated substantial liabilities. In industrial countries, external positions 
have generally increased relative to GDP, with debtors (such as Australia, Spain, and the 
United States) accumulating more liabilities and creditors (such as Japan and Switzerland) 
more assets. With the increase in gross assets and liabilities, the valuation effects induced by 
changes in exchange rates and asset prices have become an important source of fluctuations 
in countries’ external portfolios, often swamping the effects of the underlying capital flows. 
 
V.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The stylized facts described in this paper illustrate the fruitfulness of the EWN II dataset as a 
comprehensive source of information on gross and net international investment positions, 
despite the severe measurement problems. Relative to the previous state of knowledge, the 
greatly-increased country coverage of the dataset is an important advance that will enable 
researchers to take a truly global view of developments in international financial trade. This 
feature is especially important in understanding the dynamics of external imbalances. 
Furthermore, the extension of the dataset to include 1999–2004 provides important 
information on the financial globalization process, in view of the ongoing increase in the 
scale of gross asset trade, accompanied by substantial shifts in the composition of 
international balance sheets, during this period.  
 
An important contribution of this paper is to highlight the shift in the structure of the external 
portfolio for emerging market economies. Taken collectively, these countries have sharply 
improved their net foreign positions over the past decade. Moreover, the risk profile of their 
external balance sheets has been substantially changed by the growth in the share of equity 
liabilities in total liabilities and the rapid growth in the accumulation of foreign reserves. 
However, this aggregate performance masks differences in trends, particularly between   
emerging Europe and emerging Asia plus the Middle East: the former has been rapidly  
accumulating net liabilities, while the latter regions have been running large surpluses.  
 
In terms of gross financial integration, we have noted that the developing world has lagged 
behind the industrial countries in terms of the scale of cross-border asset trade (especially in 
the debt category). We may expect some catch-up by these countries, in line with further 
progress in domestic financial development and external capital account liberalization.  That 
said, the increasing prominence of the major emerging market economies as international 
investors is already reshaping the nature of international asset trade. 
 
There is a rich set of potential applications of this dataset. For instance, in combination with 
data on international investment income and capital flows, the dataset also makes it possible 
to study rates of return on holdings of foreign assets and liabilities on a much broader scale 
than was previously feasible. This will deliver a greater degree of insight into the role played 
by the valuation channel in the international adjustment process. 
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In terms of the research agenda, there is clearly scope for a two-pronged strategy. In one 
direction, much remains to be achieved in understanding the determinants of the cross-
country and time-series variation in gross and net external positions (especially for 
developing countries). In the other direction, our estimates of foreign asset and liability 
positions can be usefully employed in empirically investigating a wide range of hypotheses 
about the impact of international financial integration on macroeconomic performance.  We 
expect the EWN II dataset to stimulate a new wave of research on these questions—by 
ourselves and by the wider research community.  
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Appendix 
 
Country/Territory List 
 
Australia  Brazil  Iran, Islamic Republic of Peru  
Austria  Brunei Darussalam Israel  Philippines  
Belgium  Bulgaria  Jamaica  Poland  
Canada  Burkina Faso  Jordan  Qatar  
Denmark  Cambodia  Kazakhstan  Romania  
Finland  Cameroon  Kenya  Russia  
France  Chad                 Korea  Rwanda               
Germany  Chile  Kuwait  Saudi Arabia  
Greece  China,P.R.: Mainland Kyrgyz Republic  Senegal  
Iceland  Colombia  Lao People's Dem.Rep Serbia and Montenegro 
Ireland  Congo, Dem. Rep. of Latvia  Singapore  
Italy  Congo, Republic of Lebanon  Slovak Republic  
Japan  Costa Rica  Libya  Slovenia  
Luxembourg  Côte d'Ivoire  Lithuania  South Africa  
Netherlands  Croatia  Macedonia  Sri Lanka  
New Zealand  Cyprus  Madagascar  Sudan  
Norway  Czech Republic  Malawi               Swaziland            
Portugal  Dominican Republic  Malaysia  Syrian Arab Republic  
Spain  Ecuador  Mali  Taiwan Province of China 
Sweden  Egypt  Malta  Tajikistan  
Switzerland  El Salvador  Mauritius  Tanzania  
United Kingdom  Equatorial Guinea    Mexico  Thailand  
United States  Estonia  Moldova  Togo                 
Albania  Ethiopia  Morocco  Trinidad and Tobago  
Algeria  Fiji                 Mozambique  Tunisia  
Angola  Gabon  Myanmar  Turkey  
Argentina  Georgia  Namibia  Turkmenistan  
Armenia  Ghana  Nepal  Uganda  
Azerbaijan  Guatemala  Nicaragua  Ukraine  
Bahrain  Guinea               Niger                United Arab Emirates  
Bangladesh  Haiti     Nigeria  Uruguay  
Belarus  Honduras  Oman  Uzbekistan  
Benin                Hong Kong S.A.R. Pakistan  Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 
Bolivia  Hungary  Panama  Vietnam  
Bosnia and Herzegovina  India  Papua New Guinea  Yemen, Republic of 
Botswana  Indonesia  Paraguay  Zambia  
   Zimbabwe  
 
Note: Industrial countries in italics. 
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Table 1. Portfolio Equity Liabilities Reported By Destination And Investor Countries, 2003 
(Aggregate data, billions US$) 
 
  
 Reported by 
destination country
Reported by 
investor countries 
Ireland 479 151 
Luxembourg 1,143 623 
United States 1,827 1,274 
 
Note: reported portfolio equity liabilities are those that countries report in their International 
Investment Position. Derived liabilities are the sum of portfolio equity assets that participants 
to the CPIS report to be holding in the given country.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Portfolio Equity Liabilities Reported By Destination And Investor Countries, 2003  
(Bilateral data, billions US$) 
 
Reported by 
destination country
Reported by 
investor countries
Holdings in the United States 
Canada 203 152
Caribbean financial centers 227 24
Singapore 73 7
Switzerland 119 52
United Kingdom 229 174
Holdings in Ireland 
Japan 15 3
United Kingdom 139 25
United States 95 22
 
Source: IMF, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS); Ireland: Lane and Ruane 
(2006); and United States, Department of the Treasury: Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. 
Securities.  
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Table 3. Evolution of Net Foreign Asset Positions:  
Industrial and Developing Regions, 1996-2004 
 
 Correlation NFA/Y 
(1996, 2004) 
Regional 
mean (1996)
Regional 
mean (2004)
Difference 
Industrial 0.82 -0.9 -6.1 -5.3 
 
Africa 0.80 -60.4 -43.8 16.6 
 
Asia 0.91 -10.7 17.9 28.6 
 
Emerging Europe 0.52 -24.2 -49.5 -25.3 
 
CIS 0.65 -7.8 -4.0 3.8 
 
Middle East 0.77 21.3 55.4 34.1 
 
Western Hemisph. 0.64 -30.7 -43.2 -12.5 
 
 
Note:  Correlation NFA/Y(1996,2004) is intraregional correlation between NFA/GDP ratios 
in 1996 and 2004. Means refer to regional averages (weighted by GDP). “Difference” is the 
change in the regional mean between 1996 and 2004. For Africa, period is 1996-2003, and 
for CIS and emerging Europe it is 1997-2004. 
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Table 4. Cumulative Value Of Net Errors And Omissions, Selected Countries (1970-2004) 
 
Cumulative net errors and 
omissions 
 Billions US$ pct of GDP 
Switzerland 140.6 40.9 
Cambodia 1.7 34.8 
Mauritius 1.6 26.9 
Nepal 1.6 25.6 
Bahrain 2.2 20.1 
  
United Kingdom 109.5 5.2 
Germany 94.4 3.4 
United States 272.9 2.3 
China,P.R.: Mainland -97.3 -5.9 
Italy -137.7 -8.2 
  
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. -21.2 -19.7 
Lebanon -4.2 -21.4 
Russia -145.6 -25.4 
Zambia -1.5 -27.6 
Norway -71.6 -28.6 
Bolivia -3.2 -33.7 
Ethiopia -2.8 -34.8 
Oman -9.7 -39.4 
Mozambique -2.6 -42.7 
Kuwait -56.6 -109.2 
 
Note: The table reports the cumulative value of net errors and omissions. A positive value of 
net errors and omissions can indicate unrecorded net capital inflows or unrecorded net 
exports, and a negative value unrecorded capital outflows or net imports. For Russia, the data 
on net errors and omissions is augmented to include “nonrepatriation of export proceeds” 
which are classified as other investment outflows but are not used in the calculation of the 
stock of other investment holdings.  
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics.
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Table 5a.  Matrix of Net Debt and Net Equity Positions: Industrial Countries, 2004 
 
NET EQUITY 
<0 >0
<0 6 11
NET DEBT 
>0 3 3
 
 
 
Table 5b.  Matrix of Net Debt and Net Equity Positions:  
Emerging Markets and Developing Countries, 2004 
 
NET EQUITY 
<0 >0
<0 73 0
NET DEBT 
>0 31 8
 
 
Note: Net Debt is the sum of debt assets and official reserves minus debt liabilities; Net 
Equity is the sum of portfolio equity and FDI assets minus portfolio equity and FDI 
liabilities. 
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Table 6. Correlation Between Current Account and Change in Net Foreign Assets: Industrial 
Countries and Emerging Markets, Annual Data, 1971-2004 
 
 Industrial countries Emerging markets 
  
1971-2004 0.41 0.66 
  
1971-81 0.71 0.72 
  
1982-92 0.63 0.73 
  
1993-2004 0.32 0.54 
  
 
Note:  Correlation of CA/GDP ratio and D(NFA)/GDP ratio for industrial countries and 
selected major emerging markets (Israel, Turkey, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Thailand, China).  
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Table 7a. Standard Deviation of Current Account and Change in Net Foreign Asset Position: 
Industrial Group, 1972-2004 
 
CA/GDP DNFA/GDP 
United States 1.7 2.2 
United Kingdom 1.8 4.5 
Austria 1.7 3.3 
Denmark 2.7 5.3 
France 1.2 3.7 
Germany 1.9 2.5 
Italy 1.7 2.7 
Netherlands 1.7 9.5 
Norway 7.0 7.9 
Sweden 2.9 8.8 
Switzerland 4.8 12.0 
Canada 2.2 3.6 
Japan 1.4 2.8 
Finland 4.2 22.8 
Greece 2.1 6.5 
Iceland 3.3 6.1 
Ireland 4.3 14.3 
Portugal 4.6 6.0 
Spain 1.9 4.2 
Australia 1.7 5.6 
New Zealand 3.3 11.8 
 
Note: CA and DNFA are expressed as ratios to GDP.  
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Table 7b. Standard Deviation of Current Account and Change in Net Foreign Asset Position: 
Selected Emerging and Developing Countries, 1982-2004 
 
 
CA/GDP DNFA/GDP 
Israel 3.5 6.6 
Turkey 2.0 4.4 
South Africa 2.5 6.6 
Argentina 3.4 13.1 
Brazil 2.7 4.3 
Chile 2.9 5.4 
Colombia 3.5 4.8 
Mexico 2.7 3.4 
Venezuela 7.1 8.5 
India 1.0 1.7 
Indonesia 3.6 6.6 
Korea 3.9 4.0 
Malaysia 8.8 11.4 
Pakistan 3.2 3.0 
Philippines 4.9 3.7 
Thailand 6.3 7.9 
China 2.1 3.6 
 
 
Note: CA and DNFA are expressed as ratios to GDP.  
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Table 8a.  Cumulative Current Account and Change in Net Foreign Asset Position: Industrial 
Group, 1972-2004 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 Change 
in NFA 
Cumulative 
current 
account
Difference Cumulative 
capital 
transfers 
Cumulative 
errors and 
omissions
United States -23.1 -38.4 15.2 -0.2 2.4
Canada -9.2 -16.5 7.4 9.5 -4.3
United Kingdom -13.7 -19.3 5.7 1.0 5.1
Switzerland 124.8 121.4 3.4 -2.0 39.5
Austria -17.1 -18.7 1.6 -1.0 4.0
Germany 7.6 9.8 -2.2 -0.7 4.6
Australia -62.3 -60.0 -2.3 3.1 -0.4
France 4.7 9.1 -4.4 -0.3 1.1
Norway 65.5 71.7 -6.2 -0.2 -28.6
Japan 37.6 44.1 -6.5 -1.6 -0.4
Portugal -68.4 -59.2 -9.2 11.4 2.4
Ireland -19.3 -4.8 -14.5 5.7 -2.2
Denmark -10.5 8.4 -19.0 0.2 0.4
Italy -18.4 -1.6 -16.8 1.6 -8.2
Greece -73.4 -52.2 -21.2 6.0 -1.8
Spain -48.7 -29.4 -19.3 8.7 -3.8
New Zealand -91.3 -66.4 -24.8 6.0 -1.5
Sweden -9.5 17.9 -27.4 -0.8 -11.2
Finland -10.7 21.2 -32.0 0.5 -1.3
Iceland -91.8 -47.1 -44.7 -0.1 -12.3
Netherlands -8.0 57.2 -65.2 -3.2 -11.9
 
Note:  All variables are scaled by 2004 GDP. The cumulative current account balance, capital 
account balance, and net errors and omissions are calculated over the period 1972-2004, 
while the change in NFA is the change in the net foreign asset position between end-1971 
and 2004. Column (3) is the difference between columns (1) and (2). Positive net errors and 
omissions can indicate unrecorded capital inflows or unrecorded net exports, while negative 
errors and omissions can indicate unrecorded outflows or unrecorded net imports. Belgium 
and Luxembourg are excluded because current and capital account data was reported jointly 
for the Belgium-Luxembourg Monetary Union until 1999. 
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Table 8b. Cumulative Current Account and Change in Net Foreign Asset Position: Selected 
Developing Countries, 1982-2004 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 Change 
in NFA 
Cumulative 
current 
account
Difference Cumulative 
debt 
forgiveness or 
capital 
transfers 
Cumulative 
errors and 
omissions
Turkey -42.2 -16.8 -25.4 0.0 2.4
South Africa 6.1 -1.0 7.0 0.0 2.4
Argentina -27.3 -54.3 27.1 10.6 -10.0
Brazil -35.0 -32.6 -2.4 2.0 -2.2
Chile -20.9 -31.7 10.8 5.5 -4.4
Mexico -32.3 -30.3 -2.0 2.4 -3.7
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 25.6 62.1 -36.5 3.3 -22.5
India -8.0 -10.1 2.0 0.0 0.2
Indonesia -45.4 -4.5 -40.9 0.0 -7.0
Korea 0.0 14.8 -14.8 -1.6 -2.1
Malaysia 4.9 30.3 -25.4 -0.5 -4.0
Philippines -39.8 -6.4 -33.4 3.5 -19.6
Thailand -24.0 -8.8 -15.2 0.0 -3.3
China,P.R.: Mainland 7.3 18.1 -10.9 0.0 -5.9
 
Note:  All variables are scaled by 2004 GDP. The cumulative current account balance, capital 
account transfers, and net errors and omissions are calculated over the period 1982-2004 
(1989-2003 for debt forgiveness), while the change in NFA is the change in the net foreign 
asset position between end-1981 and 2004. Column (3) is the difference between columns (1) 
and (2). Positive net errors and omissions can indicate unrecorded capital inflows or 
unrecorded net exports, while negative errors and omissions can indicate unrecorded 
outflows or unrecorded net imports. 
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Figure 1. World NFA Discrepancy and Cumulative Current Account Discrepancy,  
1980-2004  
(Share of world GDP) 
 
 
NFA discrepancy
Cumulative current 
account discrepancy
-7%
-6%
-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004  
Note: the cumulative current account discrepancy is the cumulative sum of the world current 
account ”residual,” given by the sum of current accounts of all countries (from the World 
Economic Outlook database). The NFA discrepancy is given by the difference between total 
assets and total liabilities of the 145 countries in the sample. Both variables are scaled by 
world GDP. 
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Figure 2. Composition of The World NFA Discrepancy, 1980-2004 
(Share of world GDP) 
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Note: All plotted series are the difference between world assets and world liabilities in the 
specific categories, scaled by world GDP. 
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Figure 3. International Financial Integration: 
Industrial Group and Emerging Markets/Developing Countries Group, 1970-2004 
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Note:  Ratio of sum of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP, 1970-2004.  
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Figure 4.  Financial Integration versus Trade Integration: 
Industrial Group and Emerging Markets/Developing Countries Group, 1970-2004 
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Note: Sum of external assets and liabilities in percent of  sum of exports and imports. 
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Figure 5.  International Equity Integration: Industrial Country Group and Emerging Markets 
and Developing Country Group, 1970-2004 
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Note:  Ratio of sum of foreign portfolio equity and FDI assets and liabilities to GDP.  
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Figure 6. Equity Share in External Liabilities: Industrial Country Group and Emerging 
Markets and Developing Country Group, 1970-2004 
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Note:  Ratio of portfolio equity and FDI liabilities to total liabilities. 
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Figure 7.  External Debt and Official Reserves, Emerging Markets and Developing Group, 
1970-2004 
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Note: The series “gross external debt” is the sum of external debt liabilities for the entire 
emerging market and developing country group as percent of the sum of total exports of 
goods and services. The series “official reserves” is the sum of official reserves for all 
countries of the group as a percent of the sum of total exports of goods and services. 
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Figure 8. Net Foreign Assets and GDP per Capita: All Countries, 2004. 
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Note: Log GDP per capita (current US dollars) on horizontal axis, NFA/GDP ratio on 
vertical axis. Correlation is 0.43. Graph excludes Brunei Darussalam (estimated net foreign 
assets of 600 percent of GDP).  
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Figure 9. Net Foreign Assets by Country Group (percent of Group GDP), 1980-2004 
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Note: The chart plots aggregate net foreign assets for the two country groups and the United 
States, divided by each group/country’s GDP. The group “other industrial countries” includes 
all industrial countries except the United States.  
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Figure 10a. Change in NFA/GDP, 1996-2004: Industrial Countries 
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Note: Switzerland is not displayed (NFA of 111% of GDP in 1996 and 131% of GDP in 
2004).
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Figure 10b. Change in NFA/GDP, 1996-2003: Africa 
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Figure 10c. Change in NFA/GDP, 1996-2004: Asia 
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Figure 10d. Change in NFA/GDP, 1997-2004: Emerging Europe  
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Figure 10e.  Change in NFA/GDP, 1997-2004: CIS Countries 
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Figure 10f. Change in NFA/GDP, 1996-2004: Middle East 
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Figure 10g.  Change in NFA/GDP, 1996-2004: Western Hemisphere 
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Note: Figure 10g excludes Nicaragua (NFA of -171% of GDP in 1996 and -104% in 2004). 
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Figure 11a.  Net Equity Position versus Net Debt Position: Industrial Group, 2004 
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Figure 11b.  Net Equity and Net Debt Position: 
Emerging Markets and Developing Countries, 2004 
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Note: Ireland and Luxembourg excluded from Chart 11a due to extreme values (in both 
cases, very high positive net debt and negative net equity). 
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